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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST -

SECTION 4B CLAYTON ACT

FRAUDULENT CONprincipal cases arose out of petitions for treble damages filed in 1962
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.' The plaintiffs, alleging conspiracies in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 contended
CEALMENT HELD TO TOLL STATUTE

-

OF LIMITATIONS.-The

that the defendants had fraudulently concealed the existence of
the alleged conspiracies. Defendants pleaded that the statute of
limitations barred these actions since "fraudulent concealment"
does not cause a tolling of the four-year statute. The Courts
of Appeals of the Second and Eighth Circuits held that "fraudulent
concealment" tolls the four-year statute of limitations applicable to
civil antitrust litigation. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), affirming 207 F. Supp. 613
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co.,
310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), reversing 210 F. Supp. 545 (W.D.
Mo. 1962).
The 1940's saw an increase in the number of civil antitrust suits for damages brought in federal courts. 3 Because of
the lack of a federal statute of limitations in this area, the federal
courts were remitted to state law to determine the statutory
period 4 and were bound by the state courts' construction of their
statutes. As a result, federal courts were confronted with the
added problem of "forum shopping," since the period of limitations
in the several states varied from one to twenty years.5 The
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws recommended to Congress a uniform statutory period. 6
I Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). "Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
2 Sherman Act § 1, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
3 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 242 (2d
Cir. 1962).
4 Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitatioils and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
29, 31 (1962).
5 Id. at 32.
6 Id. at 31.
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Several Congressmen proposed various amendments to include a
tolling provision which would protect plaintiffs injured by fraud
or conspiracy.7
On January 7, 1956, the federal four-year statute of limitations in civil antitrust suits under Section 4B of the Clayton
Act became effective. This section provides: "Any action to
enforce any cause of action under sections 15 or 15a of this title
shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued. .

.

."

8

The ensuing split, in the construction of the above section
among the district courts revolves basically around two interpretations of legislative intent. Some argue that Congress expressly
rejected tolling provisions based on the doctrine of "fraudulent
concealment" while others contend that the intent of Congress
was only to provide for a "discovery provision," i.e., a suspension
of the running of the statute until the plaintiff discovered or should
reasonably have discovered the conspiracy.9 The district courts
for Colorado, 10 Southern New York,-1 Northern Illinois, 12 and
Eastern Pennsylvania1 3 all decided in favor of tolling. Those for
Western Missouri, 14 Northern Georgia, 15 Utah, 16 and New Mexico I"
decided that the statute should not be tolled. The principal cases
represent the first pronouncements in this area by appellate courts.
7 See H.R. RF,. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 4954,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 467, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R.
3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 1986, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951);
H.R. 1323, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 8763, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950); H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 4985, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949).
8 Clayton Act §4B, added by 69 Stat 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(1958).

9 See Hearings Before the Subcoinmittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1,
pt 3 (1951) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on, the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1,
14, pt. 5 (1950); Hearings on S.1910 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Connittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
10 Public Serv. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., Civil No. 7349, D. Colo., Sept.

11, 1962.
11 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec., supra note 3.
12 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F. Supp.
557 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
13 United

1962.

States v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 29379, E.D. Pa., Aug. 21,

14 Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 545 (W.D.
Mo. 1962).
15 Rinzler v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., Civil No. 7427, N.D. Ga., Oct. 29,
1962.
16Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574 (D. Utah
1962).
17Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 4924, D.N.M., July
25, 1962.
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Since the rationale of the Second Circuit has been adopted by the
Eighth Circuit, the principal cases will be treated as one, with
the dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit being given individual
treatment.
The plaintiffs in the principal cases alleged a violation of
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. As early as 1948 and until 1960,
the defendants used a scheme called the "light of the moon
formula" for quoting to utility companies almost identical prices
for electrical equipment. Through a rotating cycle the defendant
corporations would be aware of each other's bids. As a result
some would bid low, some intermediately, and others high. Each
bidder's position would then rotate, and the prices submitted consequently gave the appearance of price competition. To conceal
this scheme, defendants would hold secret meetings, call officers
at their homes, use public pay phones, conceal or destroy records
and resort to other practices to fix prices. The defendants set up
as an affirmative defense that the statute of limitations under
Section 4B of the Clayton Act barred the cause of action and
that fraudulent concealment, even if established, does not toll
the statute. As a basis for their contention, defendants offered
various arguments which shall be treated in conjunction with the
decisions presently under discussion.
The majority opinions 18 rely upon the doctrine established in
Bailey v. Glover 19 in which it was held that the equitable doctrine
of fraudulent concealment is read into every federal limitations
statute. This doctrine is intended to enable a plaintiff "to obtain
redress against a fraud concealed by the other party, or from
which its nature remains a secret" 20 and in furtherance of this
purpose, tolls the statute until the fraud is discovered. This rule
was reaffirmed in Exploration Co. v. United States21 and Hohrnberg v. Armbrecht.22 The Court, in the cases under consideration,
then ruled that there is a presumption that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was well known to Congress and was thus
present by implication in section 4B. 23 The dissent in the Second
Circuit, relying strongly on the language of the statute that "any
action" shall be "forever barred," concluded that the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute.2 4 The dissenting
18 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 239 (2d
Cir. 1962); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 275

(8th Cir. 1962).
1988 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
20 Id. at 349.

21247 U.S. 435, 446 (1918).
22327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
28 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 18, at 239;
Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., .sipra note 18, at 277.
24 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 18, at 241.
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opinion points out that the lack of discussion of the doctrine in
the statute's legislative history evidences congressional unawareness
25
and invokes 26 the statement by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
of it,
enunciated in Holmberg that "if Congress explicitly puts a limit
upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is
an end of the matter." 27 Because of the apparently unambiguous
language in section 4B, the dissent contended that the statute is
definitive.
The majority arrived at a contrary conclusion upon their
analysis of legislative history and congressional intent. Before its
enactment, various amendments28 had been proposed to provide 29a
They were, however, rejected.
tolling provision in the statute.
The majorities in the Second and Eighth Circuits believed that
intent could be derived from the colloquy between Congressman
Patman and the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Congressman Celler.30 The statute, as enacted, provided for a running from
the time of the wrong and not from the time of the discovery.
Mr. Patman asked if that would be true in the case of fraud
or conspiracy. Chairman Celler's answer was "No". He explained
that in cases of fraud or conspiracy the statute would run from
the time the wrong was discovered. 31 The dissenting opinion
251d. at 244. "If some equitable doctrine of discovery is to be read into
every federal statute of limitations then such a doctrine has assumed such
quasi-Constitutional dimensions that any statute enacted by the Congress which

attempts to put an end to potential litigation within the memory of man-or
at least of the witness-might for all practical purposes be as unconstitutional as those statutes which offend against the Constitutional amendments
themselves."
Id. at 241.
2
6Id.at 242.
27 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra note 22, at 395.
28 See H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; H.R. 4954, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 467, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; H.R. 3408,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 1986, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R.
1323, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951); H.R. 8763, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950);
H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 4985, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949).
29 Ibid. See HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
1, pt. 3 (1951) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 14, pt. 5 (1950); Hearing on S. 1910 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
30 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 241 (2d
Cir. 1962); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 278-80
(8th Cir. 1962).
31 H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
"Mr. Celler: We provide that the 4-year statute shall start to run ...
from the time the wrong was done, not from the time of discovery.
"Mr. Patman: Even in the case of fraud or conspiracy?
"Mr. Celler: No. In the case of fraud or conspiracy the statute of
limitations only runs from the time of discovery.
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notes that since these two Congressmen were proponents of the
tolling provisions that were rejected, this colloquy does not establish congressional intent, and that the conclusion drawn from this
'3 2
colloquy by the majority "is an unwarranted speculation.
Many of the opinions which favor tolling establish a distinction between "discovery provisions" and fraudulent concealment.3 3 They therefore determine that the rejected amendments were specifically for discovery provisions and did not
concern fraudulent concealment at all. Hence, these opinions
maintain that a rejection of these amendments did not establish
a congressional intent to reject a tolling for fraudulent concealment.
In 1961, the Second Circuit passed on a similar issue in
Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co.3 4

There, the Court of

Appeals looked to state law in determining whether the state
statute of limitations could be tolled by fraudulent concealment.
The court decided that it could. As a result, federal judges,
including Judge Feinberg in the Southern District of New York,3 5
are relying upon Moviecolor as a precedent for holding that
fraudulent concealment tolls the federal statute. Although the
Second Circuit affirmed the findings of Judge Feinberg, it noted
that Moviecolor "is not dispositive of the question before us ... "
,
The principal cases represent, therefore, the first time a Courts of
Appeals has decided this issue with reference to a federal statute.
The majority in the Second Circuit maintained that the equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute unless "Congress
expressly provides to the contrary in clear and unambiguous
language." 37 The Eighth Circuit emphasized that courts should
interpret statutes only if the language is ambiguous. The Court
38
thought, however, that an interpretation in this case was necessary.
The dissent in the Second Circuit argued that congressional intent
in this case was clear
and therefore the courts are bound by the
39
statute as it stands.

"Mr. Patman:

That is the point I wanted to make sure of.

not attempting to change that particular part of it?

You are

"Mr. Celler: Not at all."
Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 30, at 243.
33M. at 240; Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co, supra note 30,
at 278.
34 288 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1961).
35 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
36 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 30, at 238-39
n.2.
37 Id. at 241.
38 Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., supra note 30, at 27374. 3 gAtlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 30, at 245.
32
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It seems fundamental that courts should consider the purpose
behind a statute giving rise to a cause of action before construing
the limitations period governing such a statute. Since the present
statute is designed to punish those who violate the antitrust laws
by granting a civil action for treble damages to those injured, it
would seem that to deny the existence of a tolling provision in
case of fraud, conspiracy or fraudulent concealment violates the
congressional intention to punish offenders. Section 16(b) 40 provides for a suspension of the statute of limitations during the
pendency of governmental litigation and for one year thereafter.
By allowing individuals to bring private suits and by expressly
suspending the limitations period for these suits during the pendency
of government actions, Congress would appear to favor the bringing
of actions by private persons for violations of the antitrust laws.
It seems inconsistent with this position not to toll the limitations
period, and thus permit offenders of the antitrust laws who are
more adept at concealing their violations to escape the civil action
entirely. To say that a tolling provision is repugnant to a limitation
statute is not a strong argument. since every statute of limitations
can be considered repugnant to individual justice because it extinguishes the legal rights of a plaintiff.41
The determination of the principal cases will result, of
necessity, in many suits, some of which might well have accrued
as early as 1914,42 the year in which Congress created the cause
of action. There are at present approximately 1900 antitrust

4069 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §16(b) (1958).
"Whenever any civil
or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain,
or punish violations of any of the anti-trust laws, but not including an
action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations
in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter:
Provided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations
in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is
suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be
forever barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or
within four years after the cause of action accrued."
41See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 242
(2d42Cir. 1962).
d. at 244-45. The Clayton Act became effective Oct. 15, 1914. Judge
Moore, in his dissenting opinion, stated very practically, "Now that the issue
has been presented so squarely in the many decisions arising out of a
common situation, it may be that Congress will endeavor to decide whether
there should be a reasonable time limit in conspiracy cases or whether litigants
should be permitted to go back to the time of Benjamin Franklin, who
probably created all the trouble by sealing up a bolt from the blue in a
little glass jar to be sold to future generations, little knowing whether
pursuant to open competition or clandestine conspiracy." Ibid.
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actions 43 awaiting a final decision upon the precise issue of whether
the existence of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of
limitations. While it is clear that the holding in the principal
cases removes the defense of the statute of limitations to actions
brought on violations which occurred many years ago, it should
be remembered that the gathering of evidence and proof of damages
44
on such claims will present a formidable task to plaintiffs.
Although there has been considerable confusion with regard
to the congressional intent, the Second and Eighth Circuits seem
to have adopted the ancient legal maxim that courts are not
disposed to allow a party to profit from his own wrong. The
Tenth Circuit in a recent decision has adopted the result reached
by the instant cases. 45 Consequently, there is no doubt that a
federal trend is emerging, but it remains for the United States
Supreme Court to effect the judicial clarity urgently required in
this growing area of civil litigation.
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Plaintiff, administratrix
of a New York domiciliary killed when defendant's airliner crashed
in Massachusetts, instituted a wrongful death action pursuant to
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute 1 in a federal district court
in New York, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship.
Defendant's motion to limit the recovery to $15,000 as prescribed
by the Massachusetts statute was denied by the district court on
the ground that the New York Court of Appeals had previously
declared that the limitation was contrary to New York's public
policy and not binding on New York courts.2 The Court of Appeals
VIOLATION OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.-

43 Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 7140, 10th Cir., March
15, 1963.

44 Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. RV.
29, 52 (1962).

45 Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 43.
1
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (1955).
"If the proprietor of a
common carrier of passengers . . . by reason of his or its negligence . . .
causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages in the

sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars,
to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant.

. . .2Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40,
172 N.E.2d 526,
528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1961) (dictum).

